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CASE COMMENTS
extended liability to this extent. Also, as this case was decided on
the pleading, the complaint might have been found defective even
under this view.
In conclusion, the court in the principal case might have reached
the same result on the basis that there was no valid contract alleged,
or that the contract fell under the rule governing land sale con-
tracts which must be registered. But the fact that there is no en-
forceable contract alleged is not a sufficient reason to deny liability
under the prior decisions in North Carolina. However, if the situa-
tion was one where the plaintiff would have received the benefit
had it not been for the defendant's unjustifiable interference, then
the plaintiff should have been able to recover although there was
no valid contract between the parties.
R. W. F.
MUNICIPAL CORPOBATIONS-DuTY TO PROTECT PoNiCE INFonMER
- No LxILITY FOR INJURY TO INFORMER. - F, as administrator,
brought an action against the city of New York for the wrongful
death of P's intestate. P's intestate had informed the police of the
whereabouts of a notorious criminal and leader of gangs, and,
through this information, the police apprehended the criminal. The
role the intestate played in the capture was greatly publicized, and
he received countless threats to his person. At the request of the
intestate, the police furnished him some special protection, but later
this protection was withdrawn over the protests of the intestate.
Soon thereafter the intestate was murdered, in gangland fashion,
by a person or persons unknown. P's bill of complaint was dismissed
by the lower court, and he appealed to the intermediate appellate
court. Affirming the order and judgment, held, with one dissent,
that there was no duty on the city of New York to protect P's
intestate, and, if such a duty did exist, the complaint failed to show
that the violation of the duty was the proximate cause of intestate's
death. Schuster v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143 N.Y.S.
2d 778 (2d Dep't 1955).
It has always been the basic duty of government to protect its
citizens from loss of life, limb or property by unlawful acts. This
duty has traditionally been vested in the various police organiza-
tions. In New York, the city charter imposes upon the police de-
partment the mandatory duty to "protect the rights of persons and
property," to "preserve the public peace," to "prevent crime," to
"detect and arrest offenders" of the law, and to "suppress riots, mobs
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and insurrections." NEW YoruK Crry CHAR-m § 35 (1938). In
case of previous emergencies, the police department had assigned
guards to protect persons whose lives had become endangered.
On occasion such special protection had been furnished even over
the protests of the protected persons. Anastasio v. Monahan, 124
N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1953). Conversely, the citizen owes a
duty to the government to aid in the execution of this governmental
function. Thus, if a citizen sees a felony committed, or knows of
its commission, he is under a duty to apprehend the offender, or
to aid in bringing him to justice. Disregard of such duty constitutes
the misdemeanor of misprision of felony. But no such duty exists
with respect to misdemeanors. CLAmU AND MAnsHALL, Cwnms §
455 (5th ed., Kearney 1952); 1 BISHOP, CRmMINAL LAw § § 716-720
(9th ed., Zane & Zollman 1923). It follows that each citizen has a
civic duty to inform the police of any knowledge he may have as
to the whereabouts of an escaped felon.
Once a person has discharged his duty of informing on a felon,
a special reciprocal duty arises on the part of the government to
protect the informer "from violence while so doing, or on account
of so doing." Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884). This
special duty "to protect against lawless violence all persons in their
service or custody in the course of the administration of justice" is
a necessary sequence to the citizen's duty of aiding law adminis-
tration. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895); Logan
v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 295 (1891). An early New York
superior court decision specifically recognized the informer's right
to police protection. Liddle v. Hodges, 2 Bos. 537, 542 (N.Y. Super.
Ct. 1858). Therefore, when the life of the informer is threatened,
the police, if they are aware of the danger, are bound to protect
him by assigning special guards. In the instant case, the intestate's
life was threatened, and he made this fact known to the police force.
He was furnished partial police protection for a short time, after
which the protection was withdrawn. Thus, even if it could be said
that the police originally had no duty to protect the intestate by
furnishing police protection, the police may have become subject
to liability for failure to use due care in the performance of a volun-
tarily undertaken obligation. "It is ancient learning that one who
assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become
subject to the duty of acting carefully if he acts at all.... The hand
once set to a task may not always be withdrawn with impunity
though liability would fail if it had never been applied at all....
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So the surgeon who operates without pay is liable, though his neg-
ligence is in the omission to sterilize his instruments.... The query
always is whether the putative wrongdoer has advanced to such a
point as to have launched a free instrument of harm, or has stopped
where inaction is at most a refusal to become an instrument for
good." Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E.
896 (1928); Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 258, 157
N.E. 129 (1927); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 239, 135 N.E.
275, 276 (1922). More than the pleadings would be necessary to
discover whether, in the instant case, the police had progressed
far enough in protecting the intestate so that the protection could
be withdrawn with impunity. The opinion of the court in the in-
stant case fails to consider such a possibility, perhaps on the theory
that the intestate was informed of the withdrawal.
The instant case is not concerned with the immunity of the
state against suit for acts of its servants or agents, as New York has
waived this immunity. Whenever a New York municipality is sued
for breach of a duty relating to a governmental function, liability
must be determined by the same rules of law as apply to persons
and corporations. Runkel v. City of New York, 282 App. Div. 173,
123 N.Y.S.2d 485 (2d Dep't 1953).
One who seeks redress at law must show more than a duty
owed to him, a violation of that duty, and that there has been
damage to his person. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99, 59 A.L.R. 1253 (1928). The injury must be the natural
and proximate consequence of the alleged negligent act which, in
New York, is a question of fact. O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis, 253
N.Y. 423, 171 N.E. 694 (1930); Miller v. National Bread Co., 247
App. Div. 88, 286 N.Y. Supp. 908 (4th Dep't 1936); Sporborg v.
State, 226 App. Div. 113, 234 N.Y. Supp. 476 (3d Dep't 1929). The
case should go to the jury if the causation of the injury by the de-
fendant's negligence may be reasonably inferred even though the
evidence fails to wipe out the remote possibility that the injury was
not caused by the negligence of the defendant. Betzag v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 298 N.Y. 358, 83 N.E.2d 833 (1949); Dillon v. Rockaway
Beach Hospital & Dispensary, 284 N.Y. 176, 179, 30 N.E.2d 373, 374
(1940); United Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Jamestown Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
242 App. Div. 420,275 N.Y. Supp. 47 (4th Dep't 1934). In his plead-
ing the plaintiff is required to show facts from which the negligence
of the defendant can reasonably be inferred, and dismissal of the com-
plaint will be affirmed only if by no rational process could a jury
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base a finding in favor of the plaintiff. Stein v. Palisi, 808 N.Y. 293,
296, 125 N.E.2d 575, 577 (1955); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo,
303 N.Y. 498, 506, 104 N.E.2d 872, 877 (1952); Cornbrooks v. Ter-
minal Barber Shops, 282 N.Y. 217, 223, 26 N.E.2d 25, 27 (1940);
Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank, 278 N.Y. 1, 7, 14 N.E.2d 823, 830 (1938).
No jury was given the opportunity to decide the question of
proximate cause in the instant case. Instead, the court dismissed the
case by ruling on the facts presented in the bill of complaint (the
intestate received anonymous threats), intimating that the police
were only bound to protect him if the identity of the originators
of the threats were known. When a man's life is anonymously
threatened, any harm coming to him might reasonably have been
anticipated, and it might also have been anticipated that the intes-
tate would not know who his murderers were. If no action was
taken to prevent the harm, the inference of negligence seems beyond
the stage of speculation and should be left for finding by a jury.
Cf., Payne v. City of New York, 277 N.Y. 393, 14 N.E.2d 449, 115
A.L.R. 1495 (1938).
If the rationale of the instant case is reasoned to conclusion, it
follows that New York municipalities are free from liability for
failure' to protect the life of endangered informers as long as the
murderer remains unknown. Liability may attach when the mur-
derer becomes known and can be connected with the anonymous
threats against the life of the informer. It would be in the financial
interest of the municipality to keep the murderer at large. Are the
informer's survivors to take over the police duties of the munici-
pality in order to apprehend the criminal, and thus to lay the basis
for recovery?
It is to be hoped that the instant case will be reversed and re-
manded for decision with more attentive consideration of the appli-
cable rules of law. The termination of what so far has been believed
to be a basic governmental duty would constitute a sad chapter in
the history of law if resulting merely from haphazard legal reason-
ing. In the meantime, the New York police may have a difficult
time of convincing the citizen that it is his duty to aid law enforce-
ment, and that failure to do so may constitute a misdemeanor.
P. B. H.
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